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The financial reporting quality effect on European firm performance 
Abstract:  This  paper  analyses  whether  accounting  quality  produces  any  impact  on  firm 
performance  using  only  accounting  data:  the  abnormal  accruals  methodology  to  evaluate 
accounting  quality  and  ROA  to  determine  firm  performance.  This  is  important  because 
accounting information guides investment decisions (Bradshaw et al., 2004 and Verdi, 2006). 
For 17 European countries, findings confirm the mechanical  relationship between accruals 
and accounting measures of performance: income increasing abnormal accruals, which mean 
decreasing accounting quality, will increase ROA and vice-versa. In addition, the lag effect is 
analysed, as per Chan et al. (2004). When current performance is compared with the abnormal 
accruals of the previous year, results suggest that the reverse effect does not occur for two 
consecutive years. 
 
JEL classification: M41- Accounting 
Key words: Accounting quality; firm performance; abnormal accruals. 3 
 
Introduction 
Financial reports are an essential source of information for the decision-making processes of 
economic agents. Investors decide whether to purchase stocks by analysing a firm’s financial 
reports.  Fields,  Lys  and  Vicent  (2001)  stated  that accounting  reports  are  needed  because 
capital markets are not strong-form efficient.  
Even in international capital movements, financial reports are crucial (Bradshaw et al., 
2004  and  Gelos  and  Wey,  2005).  Creditors  decide  whether  to  lend  or  not  and  establish 
contractual  terms,  namely  interest  rates,  considering  accounting  figures,  as  shown  by 
Gopalakrishan (1994) and Beatty and Weber (2003).  
Thus,  accounting  quality  is  of  great  concern.  Bharath,  Sunder  and  Sunder  (2008) 
argued that poor accounting quality will make it harder to estimate a firm’s ability to repay 
debt  and  to  pay  dividends.  By  contrast,  higher  accounting  quality  reduces  financial 
information asymmetry by increasing investment efficiency (Verdi, 2006), and by earnings 
being more representative of future cash flows (Garcia-Teruel Martinez-Solano, and Sanchez-
Ballesta,  2009).  Regarding  a  firm’s  performance  in  the  capital  markets,  Christie  and 
Zimmerman (1994) indicated that an accounting choice is efficient when it maximizes  the 
firm’s value and that this efficiency varies across industries and years.  
This paper’s contribution is to test the relationship between accounting quality and 
firm  performance  using  only  accounting  information:  for  firm  performance  we  use  two 
accounting ratios: Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE), which are easily 
calculated and allow us to compare firms of different sizes. For earnings quality, we chose the 
abnormal accruals methodology for two reasons: a) data collection, because some countries in 
the sample did not issue cash flows in all periods considered; b) abnormal accruals have been 
extensively used in literature as a proxy of accounting quality (Warfield et al., 1995; Larcker 
and Richardson, 2004, Verdi, 2006; Garcia-Teruel et al., 2009). A further contribution is the 
broad sample of 40 sectors  in  17 European countries, and the lengthy ten-year  period of 
analysis.  
The  remainder  of  this  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  The  first  section  presents  the 
hypotheses and a review of extant literature. In the second section, the data and methodology 
are identified for the empirical work. The econometric models and the variables are defined 
and several statistics are also included. The third section contains the results of the empirical 
tests, which are then analysed. Additional tests are made to verify the robustness of the results 4 
 
in order to assure that they are not skewed by any statistical problems. The conclusions are in 
the final section.  
 
Section 1: Hypotheses and literature review 
When managers  consider a change  in accounting  method,  they  take into account specific 
factors of firm, industry and even country. The theory of contracts developed the analysis of 
the  contractual  relationship  between  manager  and  firm  in  order  to  reduce  financial 
information  asymmetry.  Another  possible  way  to  reduce  this  problem  is  to  improve 
accounting quality as mentioned by Verdi (2006) and Garcia-Teruel et al. (2009). The results 
of Verdi (2006) showed that the quality of financial reporting, given by abnormal accruals, 
increases investment efficiency, namely by reducing under- and overinvestment. Bradshaw et 
al. also found evidence that American investors increase their investment in countries that 
exhibit  higher  accounting  quality,  using  an  accounting  conformity  ratio  to  the  Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Garcia-Teruel et al. (2009) indicated that firms 
with higher accounting quality, also given by abnormal accruals, hold lower cash levels. In 
addition,  Helwege  et  al.  (2007)  argued  that  institutional  investors  monitor  larger  firms, 
therefore information asymmetries are reduced and managers tend to be less inefficient. 
Regarding financial structure, Bharath et al. (2008) stated that poor accounting quality 
(estimated by abnormal accruals) makes it harder to estimate a firm’s ability to repay debt and 
to pay dividends. 
In  this  paper,  we  test  the mechanical  relationship  between earnings  and  abnormal 
accruals.  As  accounting  profit  figures  are  comprised  of  accruals  and  cash  flows,  any 
relationship is expected to be simply mechanical. 
As fundamental analysis is employed, two accounting ratios of firm performance are 
used:  ROE and ROA. These ratios are easily obtained and make it possible to compare firms 
of different sizes. Therefore, the null hypotheses are: income increasing abnormal accruals 
will  increase  measures  of  performance,  and  income  decreasing  abnormal  accruals  will 
decrease measures of performance. 
Equation (1) and (2) are used to test these hypotheses: 
) var ( 3 2 1 iables control AA ROE it it      
                                                                            
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) var ( 3 2 1 iables control AA ROE it it      
                                                                           
(2) 
The other approach  employed is the lagged effects of AA in ROE. This is because 
managers make decisions using information of the preceding year. Chan et al. (2004) found 
that future earnings would decrease in the next year, and even more in three years’ time with 
an increase of current accruals. Thus, we have Equation (3): 
) var ( 3 1 2 1 iables control AA ROE it it       
                                                                      
(3) 
The model also uses ROA as a dependent variable in order to test whether results are 
or not driven by the firm’s performance proxy. 
As  in  previous  research,  Abnormal  Accruals  (AA)  is  employed  as  a  proxy  of 
accounting quality. This methodology was first introduced by Jones (1991) and modified by 
Dechow et al. (1995) and then used in a large number of studies (e.g. Garcia-Teruel et al., 
2009, Verdi, 2006, Larcker and Richardson, 2004 and Warfield et al., 1995). 
AA is estimated by total accruals regression using the cross-sectional approach. The 
AA variable contains the residuals of that regression; therefore the AA variable is the part that 
is not explained by the explanatory variables included (Investment and cash sales): 
  it it 3 it it 2 1 it u PPE ΔRec ΔSal TA                                                                                 
(4) 
Where, 
it TA   Total Accruals computed by equation (4); 
it ΔSal :  Change in sales for firm i between year t and t-1 (wc01001); 
it ΔRec :  Change in receivables for firm i between year t and t-1 (wc02051); 
it PPE :  Property, plant and equipment- gross for firm i at year t 
(wc02301); 
it u :  Error term for firm i at year t. 
   6 
 
All variables are scaled by the average of total assets at the end of the current year and 
at the end of the previous year. This is to reduce heteroskedasticity problems arising from the 
differing sizes of the firms. Thus, in this model it is assumed that changes in revenues, less 
changes in receivables, as well as capital intensity create normal accruals. The credit sales are 
supposed to be abnormal. 
A  two-step  methodology  is  followed:  first  the  Total  Accruals  (TA)  variable  is 
computed by the balance sheet approach.  This is because some countries did not disclose the 
cash flow map for the whole period considered. Therefore, we obtained TA by Equation (5): 
TA  =  ∆  Rec  +  ∆  Inv  +  ∆  OCA  -  ∆  AP  –  Dep                                                                                
(5) 
Where: 
∆ Rec:  Change in receivables (wc02051); 
∆ Inv:  Change in inventories (wc02101); 
∆ OCA:  Change in other current assets (wc02149); 
∆ AP:  Change in accounts payables (wc03040); 
Dep:  Depreciation and amortization (wc01151). 
The  second  step  consists  of  estimating  the  Regressions  (4)  to  obtain  the  AA  by 
residuals, which are estimated in a cross-sectional approach. As 40 industries are included in a 
10-year period, then 400 regressions are estimated. The number of observations per industry 
differs, though with a minimum of 9 observations (firms per year). This approach assumes 
that AA is homogeneous in each industry, as stated by Larcker and Richardson (2004). 
 
Section 2: Methodology: Econometric Model, Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
2.1.1. Econometric model variables definitions 
The relationship between firm performance and accounting information quality is estimated 
using an econometric model. 
it it it it it it Size Big DE AA ROE            





it ROE :  Return on equity (wc08301); 
it AA
 :  The positive Abnormal Accruals estimated; 
it Size :  Log of total assets of firm i at year t (total assets-key item- 
wc02999); 
it DE   Total debt to common equity (wc08231); 
it Big4   Dummy=1 when firm i is audited by one of the biggest 
international auditing firms at year t, and 0 otherwise 
(wc07800); 
it  :  Error term for firm i at year t. 
This model is also tested with ROA as the dependent variable, with negative values of 
AA, and lagged AAA as an explanatory variable. 
An  unbalanced  panel  technique  is  used  for  the  estimations  of  determinants  in  the 
firm’s  performance  Model.  This  allows  us  to  obtain  coefficient  estimations  that  consider 
differences  by  including  several  years  and  firms  where  some  accounting  data  might  be 
missing.  
The data panel is unbalanced because some variables do not have values for certain 
years.  This  technique  substitutes  the  missing  variables  and  increases  the  efficiency  of 
estimated coefficients (Soares and Stark, 2008). 
If there is no correlation between the unobserved, individual, firm-specific effects  it u  
and the explanatory variables, the best way to estimate the model is using random effects as 
explained by Mcknight and Weir (2009). Panel data is estimated with fixed-effects because 
random coefficients were correlated and the results of Wooldridge (2005) show that the fixed-
effects estimator is robust.  
2.1.2. Variables definitions 
While AA is the main explanatory variable in this investigation, other control variables that 
are also expected to affect the firm’s performance are included: 
Size is the natural logarithm (ln) of total assets of firm i in year t. For all countries the 
total assets were in Euros. Therefore, local currency for five countries is not used: Denmark, 
Norway,  Sweden,  Switzerland  and  the United  Kingdom.  The  expected  signal  is  positive, 8 
 
because the  biggest  firms  that  have  the  best  performances  also  have  the  best accounting 
services, as explained by Bradshaw et al. (2004), Beatty and Weber (2002), Mitton (2002), 
DeFond and Park (1997);  
DE is the capital structure variable, given by the ratio of total debt to common equity, 
whose expected signal is positive because higher leverage means higher risk and thus higher 
costs; creditors and shareholders demand a greater return, as mentioned by Bradshaw et al. 
(2004), Warfield et al. (1995) and Christie and Zimmerman (1994). In addition, managers aim 
to avoid bad credit covenants (Beatty and Weber, 2002; Gopalakrishnan, 1994); 
The third control variable is the Big4, which is expected to be positively correlated 
with the firm’s performance. A firm audited by one of the biggest international audit firms 
will  present  more  accurate  accounting  information  because  the  firm  must  report  all  its 
earnings (Bradshaw et al., 2004 and Mitton, 2002). 
2.2. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
2.2.1. Sample 
Accounting data is collected from Worldscope for 17 European countries from 1997 to 2006. 
Only  firms  that  have  accounting  information  available  in  Worldscope  for  all  years  are 
included. This condition is imposed only to estimate the abnormal accruals. This gives us 
1,490 firms with 14,900 firm-year observations. In addition, firms with a Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code of 6000 to 6999 were excluded because financial institutions have 
specific regulations. This reduced the sample to 1,477 firms.  
Firms in industries with fewer than 9 firms are also excluded. This is because the 
Model has 8 explanatory variables. This restriction further reduces our sample by 19 firms. In 
the end, the sample contains 1,406 firms in 40 industries.  
For  the  determinants  Model  with  current  AA,  the  sample  has  14,060  firm-year 
observations over a ten-year period (1997 to 2006). For lagged AA, this implies a loss of one 
year. Therefore, regression estimations are made with a total of 12,654 firm-year observations 
over  a  nine-year  period,  from  1998 to 2006.  Then  we  divided the  sample  into  two  sets: 
positive AA and negative AA. 
2.2.2. Descriptive statistics  
The collected sample presents a heterogeneous structure because the number of firms from 
each country varies considerably. 9 
 
For the period considered, and from Table 1, 1,068 firms were audited by one of the 
biggest auditing firms.  This represents almost 76% of the total sample.  
Luxembourg is the country with the highest percentage of Big4 audits: all firms were 
audited by a Big4 firm. Ireland exhibits strong investor protection (one of the two countries 
with common law) as more than 86% of firms were audited by one of the Big4 (Table 1 and 
Table 2). Norway also has a high percentage of firms audited by a Big4, at 96%. In contrast, 
France has the smallest percentage of Big4-audited firms in the sample. Portugal, Greece and 
Spain only had half of their firms audited by one of the Big4. These numbers are in agreement 
with La Porta et al. (1998). These countries have code/French law origins, which provide less 
protection for investors than those of other legal origins. As mentioned above, in Luxembourg 
all firms were audited by one of the Big4. This is the highest percentage of firms with a Big4 
audit. However, only four firms from this country were included in the sample due to the 
restrictions explained above.  
Table 1: Countries corporate governance characteristics 
Countries     Cross-section  Law/ Origin 
   Total Firms  Big4  % Big4    
Austria  30  18  60.00  Code/German 
Belgium  33  24  72.73  Code/French 
Denmark  49  42  85.71  Code/ Scandinavian 
Finland  53  42  79.25  Code/ Scandinavian 
France  180  91  50.56  Code/French 
Germany  184  130  70.65  Code/German 
Greece  42  19  45.24  Code/French 
Ireland  19  19  100.00  Common/English 
Italy  79  69  87.34  Code/French 
Luxembourg  4  4  100.00  Code/French 
Netherlands  68  65  95.59  Code/French 
Norway  23  22  95.65  Code/ Scandinavian 
Portugal  13  7  53.85  Code/French 
Spain  44  28  63.64  Code/French 
Sweden  65  64  98.46  Code/ Scandinavian 
Swiss  92  82  89.13  Code/German 
UK  428  342  79.91  Common/English 
Total  1406  1068  75.96    
 
In Table 2, the UK had the highest number of audited firms, with close to 31% of 
firms in the sample. Firms in all industries were considered; with the exception of SIC code 
16 (Building- Heavy). The number of firms from countries with code law is larger than the 10 
 
number of firms under common law (68% of the 17 countries considered, less the UK and 
Ireland).  Taking  into  account  the  conclusions  of  La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes  and  Vishny 




Table 2: Number of firms per country and industries in cross- sectional sample  
SIC2 




13  0  0  0  0  4  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  9  16  1.1 
15  5  1  1  2  3  3  0  2  0  0  2  0  3  0  1  0  20  43  3.1 
16  0  0  2  0  4  3  5  3  0  0  3  0  0  7  1  0  0  28  2.0 
17  1  0  0  1  2  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  7  15  1.1 
20  4  7  5  6  15  12  5  4  0  2  6  0  1  2  1  7  15  92  6.5 
22  1  0  1  0  3  1  1  0  10  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  5  23  1.6 
23  0  0  0  2  1  9  1  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  4  19  1.4 
25  0  0  1  0  1  1  2  0  0  0  3  1  0  0  0  0  2  11  0.8 
26  2  0  1  9  2  2  0  0  3  0  1  2  2  1  6  1  3  35  2.5 
27  0  0  1  2  1  1  0  2  6  0  5  2  0  0  1  3  12  36  2.6 
28  1  2  5  1  13  19  2  1  5  0  4  0  0  2  0  6  31  92  6.5 
29  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  2  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  2  9  0.6 
30  1  4  0  2  4  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  6  22  1.6 
32  4  0  5  0  5  13  2  3  4  0  1  0  1  2  0  2  11  53  3.8 
33  2  3  0  1  2  1  6  0  2  0  2  2  0  2  1  5  8  37  2.6 
34  0  0  0  3  6  2  2  1  1  0  2  0  0  0  3  4  13  37  2.6 
35  0  1  1  4  8  26  1  0  3  0  4  2  0  0  9  16  19  94  6.7 
36  1  2  3  4  14  14  0  0  5  0  3  1  0  2  4  7  24  84  6.0 
37  1  2  0  0  8  12  0  0  11  0  1  0  0  3  7  1  9  55  3.9 
38  0  0  2  1  5  5  0  0  5  0  1  1  0  0  3  6  19  48  3.4 
39  0  0  0  1  2  2  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  6  12  0.9 
42  0  0  1  0  3  1  0  0  0  0  2  0  0  0  0  0  3  10  0.7 
44  0  1  1  3  0  2  1  1  0  0  0  3  0  0  1  1  4  18  1.3 
45  2  0  1  1  1  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  5  14  1.0 
47  0  0  1  0  1  2  1  0  3  0  0  0  0  2  0  1  4  15  1.1 
48  0  2  1  0  6  1  1  0  4  1  2  0  1  2  4  2  7  34  2.4 
49  2  2  0  2  7  6  0  0  2  1  0  2  1  5  0  5  14  49  3.5 
50  0  1  6  3  11  7  5  1  0  0  5  1  0  2  5  6  27  80  5.7 
51  2  1  3  1  14  15  3  2  1  0  2  2  0  3  0  4  6  59  4.2 
53  0  0  0  2  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  2  5  12  0.9 
54  0  2  0  2  3  0  0    0  0  3  0  2  0  0  1  3  16  1.1 
55  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  3  0  5  10  0.7 
56  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  3  1  8  14  1.0 
58  0  0  0  0  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  3  10  15  1.1 
59  0  1  0  0  3  3  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  7  16  1.1 
70  0  0  0  0  4  1  1  0  2  0  0  0  0  2  0  1  7  18  1.3 
73  0  1  2  0  9  7  1  0  3  0  6  1  0  1  9  6  46  92  6.5 
79  0  0  0  0  5  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  2  0  0  1  8  17  1.2 
80  0  0  0  0  1  5  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  4  11  0.8 
87  0  0  4  0  3  1  0  0  0  0  5  1  0  0  2  0  29  45  3.2 
Total 
Country  30  33  49  53  181  184  41  22  76  4  68  23  13  44  66  92  427  1406  100.0 
% of total  2.1  2.3  3.5  3.8  12.9  13.1  2.9  1.6  5.4  0.3  4.8  1.6  0.9  3.1  4.7  6.5  30.4  100    12 
 
The industry with the largest number of firms is SIC code 35 (Industrial), with 6.7% of 
the total. But there are several industries around 6%, such as SIC code 73 (Business Services), 
28 (Chemicals) and 20 (Food). The industries with the fewest number of firms are SIC code 
29 (Petroleum), with the minimum 9 firms, and SIC code 39 (Manufacturing), with 10 firms. 
The composition of the sample by country and industry is shown in Table 2. 
In  Table  3  are  the  two-digit  SIC  code  industries  with  their  respective  means  of 
Absolute value of AA (AAA), of ROE and of positive AA and negative AA. SIC code 15 
(Buildings- Light) has the highest mean of AAA in averaged total assets, over 8.4%. This 
industry represents just 3% of the total sample (Table 2). ROE is above the average (7.66% 
and 6.23%, respectively), which suggests that positive AA has a stronger impact on ROE than 
negative AA. However, it is not the highest value. 
The three most represented industries, SIC code 35- Industrial, SIC code 36-Electrical 
and 73- Business Services, have high levels of AAA, with a mean of close to 6.7%, 6.6% and 
8% of total assets, respectively. In other words, in Tables 3 and 2 it is possible to see high 
levels  of  AAA  in  industries  that  have  a  considerable  number  of  firms.  Together,  these 
industries represent more than 21% of the sample with AAA above the sample average (Table 
3). Further, more than half of the industries considered (21 of 40) have levels of AAA higher 
than the sample mean. However, considering the ROE these three industries exhibit lower 
levels than the sample mean (nearly 4.5% and 5%), which suggests that negative AA has a 
stronger impact on ROE than positive AA. Thus, we have opposing evidence. 
The industries with the fewest AAA are water and air transportation (SIC code 44 and 
45), with nearly 2% in each (Table4). These industries are not very representative because 
they each constitute less than 1% of the sample. The ROE is 3.79% and 7.78%, respectively 
(Tables 2 and 3). 
In Table 4 we have some descriptive statistics. The mean of positive AA is 5.13% of 
the averaged total assets and very similar to negative AA, which is 5.17%. The mean firm size 
is about €4,564,950.00. On average, the ROA is higher for positive AA than for negative AA: 
5.97% and 3.97, respectively. If we consider ROE, these differences are more significant; 
13.2% for positive AA and 4.4% for negative AA. The debt to equity ratio is 88% for income 
increasing AA and almost 92% in income decreasing AA. However, standard deviation is 
higher for income decreasing AA. 13 
 
  In  Table  5  we  see  the  highest  correlation  between  AA  and  dependant  variable 
observed for negative AA and ROA, which is nearly 0.22. The correlations with positive AA 
are not so strong: 0.044 for ROE and 0.041 for ROA. The correlation between ROA and DE 
ratio is still very small and negative. This contrasts with ROE, which is positive and above 
0.10. The correlation between Size and Big4 is 0.28 for positive AA and 0.22 for negative 
AA. 14 
 
Table 3: Industry denomination and each absolute value of Abnormal Accruals 
SIC2  Industry  AAA  ROE  AA+  AA- 
13  Oil & Gas  0.048364655  7.328252  0.023052  -0.02378 
15  Building- Light  0.084022459  7.664727  0.042011  -0.04201 
16  Building- Heavy  0.074996399  5.993611  0.037498  -0.0375 
17  Construction  0.053132166  7.077556  0.026566  -0.02657 
20  Food  0.049722951  6.928104  0.024861  -0.02486 
22  Textile mill  0.041374786  3.130676  0.020687  -0.02069 
23  Apparel  0.049965843  11.03801  0.024983  -0.02498 
25  Furniture  0.061007529  6.840202  0.030504  -0.0305 
26  Paper  0.03154976  4.640857  0.015775  -0.01577 
27  Printing  0.033504601  10.74227  0.016752  -0.01675 
28  Chemicals  0.045037408  3.721276  0.022519  -0.02252 
29  Petroleum  0.022230844  8.610864  0.011115  -0.01112 
30  Rubber  0.037141488  7.731531  0.018571  -0.01857 
32  Stone  0.042937747  6.602274  0.021469  -0.02147 
33  Metal Work- Basic  0.049609058  4.637778  0.024805  -0.0248 
34  Metal Work- Fabrication  0.039247411  7.565498  0.019624  -0.01962 
35  Industrial  0.066969671  4.55785  0.033485  -0.03348 
36  Electrical  0.065500408  4.632887  0.03275  -0.03275 
37  Transport Equipment  0.049874877  6.595374  0.024937  -0.02494 
38  Instruments  0.04653678  6.67014  0.023268  -0.02327 
39  Misc. Manufacturing  0.049078812  10.57713  0.024539  -0.02454 
42  Motor Freight  0.040155187  7.847444  0.020078  -0.02008 
44  Water Transport  0.027941279  3.786852  0.013971  -0.01397 
45  Air Transport  0.022271353  7.776694  0.011136  -0.01114 
47  Transport Services  0.050448316  6.667704  0.025232  -0.02522 
48  Communications  0.050084184  8.273929  0.025042  -0.02504 
49  Utilities  0.033087356  6.344626  0.016544  -0.01654 
50  Durables- Wholesale  0.062722744  7.218565  0.031361  -0.03136 
51  Non Durables- Wholesale  0.053159494  6.070678  0.02658  -0.02658 
53  General Stores  0.029425799  6.772315  0.014713  -0.01471 
54  Food Stores  0.025833165  7.905694  0.012917  -0.01292 
55  Auto Dealers  0.049041197  6.414556  0.024521  -0.02452 
56  Apparel Retail  0.054097932  1.976111  0.027049  -0.02705 
58  Eating  0.023159576  7.986567  0.01158  -0.01158 
59  Misc. Retail  0.045700191  3.102014  0.02285  -0.02285 
70  Hotels  0.037618876  7.58537  0.018809  -0.01881 
73  Business Services  0.079249074  5.04233  0.039625  -0.03962 
79  Amusement & Recreation Services  0.048993939  0.05876  0.024497  -0.0245 
80  Health Services  0.04029709  2.719495  0.020149  -0.02015 
87 
Engineering, Accounting &Management 
Services  0.07194476  2.49665  0.035972  -0.03597 




Table 4: Descriptive statistics  
Positive AA           
   ROE  ROA  AA  SIZE  DE 
 Mean  13.2147  5.9715  0.0513  4564950  88.0307 
 Median  12.5900  5.9100  0.0331  466564.5  56.3400 
Maximum  2019.0200  106.8500  0.9291  264000000  37501.9200 
Minimum  -494.0000  -89.9600  0.0000  2765  -23635.1400 
 Std. Dev.  37.9685  8.1633  0.0613  15731715  717.1418 
Obs.  6,872  6,872  6,872  6,872  6,872 
Negative AA           
 Mean  4.42196  3.9705  -0.0517  13.1854  91.9254 
 Median  10.6700  4.8600  -0.0336  12.9599  56.1900 
Maximum  1742.860  125.0100  0.0000  19.4289  29869.4300 
Minimum  -7034.1400  -267.1500  -0.9877  7.4012  -93200.0000 
 Std. Dev.  123.8218  11.4705  0.0622  1.9891  1377.3590 
Obs.  6,667  6,667  6,667  6,667  6,667 
Definition of variables: AA is the absolute value of AA and this is abnormal accruals and consists of residuals of 
regression  estimation:    i 3 2 1 i u PPE α es Δreceivabl Δsales α α TA      .  TA  is  Total  Accruals  and  is  obtained  by 
changes  in  receivables  (wc02051)  plus  change  in  inventories  (wc02101)  and  change  in  other  current  assets 
(wc02149) less change in accounts payables (wc03040) and less depreciation (wc01151). All variables from this 
model  are  scaled  by  the  average  of  total  assets  (wc02999).  Size  is  the  natural  logarithm  of  total  assets 
(wc02999). ROA is returns on assets (wc08326). Finally, DE is Debt to Equity and is defined as total debt to 
common equity (wc08231). 
 
Table 5: Correlations between firm’s performance and the independent variables 
Panel A: Correlations using positive AA 
  ROE  ROA  AA  SIZE  DE  BIG4 
ROE  1.0000  0.5435  0.0435  0.0479  0.1079  0.0649 
ROA  0.5435  1.0000  0.0405  0.0587  -0.0024  0.0800 
AA+  0.0435  0.0405  1.0000  -0.1579  0.0063  -0.0850 
SIZE  0.0479  0.0587  -0.1579  1.0000  0.0412  0.2861 
DE  0.1079  -0.0024  0.0063  0.0412  1.0000  0.0292 
BIG4  0.0649  0.0800  -0.0850  0.2861  0.0292  1.0000 
Panel B: Correlations using negative AA   
ROE  1.0000  0.2892  0.0672  0.0678  0.1245  0.0440 
ROA  0.2892  1.0000  0.2167  0.1454  -0.0069  0.0688 
AA-  0.0672  0.2167  1.0000  0.1788  -0.0008  0.0687 
SIZE  0.0678  0.1454  0.1788  1.0000  0.0262  0.2276 
DE  0.1245  -0.0069  -0.0008  0.0262  1.0000  -0.0185 
BIG4  0.0440  0.0688  0.0687  0.2276  -0.0185  1.0000 




Section 3: Empirical results 
From the results, we see that the adjusted R squared is at low levels for all tests. However, it 
is higher with ROA than with ROE in all estimations: 
  As expected, the effect of abnormal accruals on firm performance is positive, be they 
positive or negative abnormal accruals: when we have more positive abnormal accruals the 
ROA  and  ROE  increase;  when  negative  abnormal  accruals  increase  the  ROA  and  ROE 
decrease.  These  results  confirm  the  mechanical  relationship  between  these  accounting 
measures. 
  The control variables excepting the leverage variable, present the expected impact on 
firm performance. Thus, becoming larger and being audited by a Big4 improves the economic 
performance of a firm in accordance with Bradshaw et al. (2004), Beatty and Weber (2002) 
and  Mitton  (2002).  When  leverage  scaled  by  equity  increases,  firm  performance  also 
increases as a result of accounting decisions made by managers in order to avoid covenants 
restrictions (Betty and Weber, 2002 and Gopalakrishnan, 1994). 
  All  the  coefficients  are  statistically  significant  at  a  1%  level,  except  the  positive 
abnormal accruals, which are significant only at 10% level and DE, which is not significant. 
See Tables 7 and 8. 17 
 
Table 7: Impact of positive AA on firm performance 
Independent   Predicted  Coefficient  Prob.  Coefficient  Prob. 
variable  Sign  (Ols t-statistics)  (Ols t-statistics) 
      ROA     ROE    
c    -2.69153  ***  -1.8353   
    (-2.89458)    (-0.5804)   
AA+  +  3.527818  *  30.5376  *** 
    (1.606115)    (4.07659)   
Size  +  0.522809  ***  0.70782  *** 
    (7.391744)    (2.95204)   
DE  -  8.06E-06    0.00543  *** 
    (0.064903)    (8.61022)   
Big4  +  1.737117  ***  4.75756  *** 
      (5.259607)     (4.27743)    
Number of Obs.   6989     6872    
Adjusted R-squared  0.02846     0.02841    
Definitions of variables: AAA is the absolute value of AA and this is abnormal accruals and consists of residuals 
of regression estimation:    i 3 2 1 i u PPE α es Δreceivabl Δsales α α TA      .  TA  is  Total  Accruals  and  is  obtained  by 
changes  in  receivables (wc02051)  plus  change  in  inventories  (wc02101)  and  change  in  other  currents  assets 
(wc02149) less changes in accounts payables (wc03040) and less depreciation (wc01151). AAA-1 is AAA in the 
previous year. All variables from this model are scaled by the ave rage of total assets (wc02999). Size is the 
natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets (wc02999); DE is Debt to Equity given by total debt to common equity 
(wc08231); Big4 is a dummy and it is 1 if auditing firm is one of the four biggest international companies and 
zero otherwise (wc07800) ROA is return on assets (wc08326);  
***correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 8: Impact of negative AA on firm performance 
Independent   Predicted  Coefficient  Prob.  Coefficient  Prob. 
variable  Sign  (Ols t-statistics)  (Ols t-statistics) 
      ROA     ROE    
c    -9.68321  ***  -38.366  *** 
    (-8.37338)    (-3.6324)   
AA-  +  38.28574  ***  113.096  *** 
    (14.3217)    (4.61004)   
Size  +  1.128091  ***  3.07997  *** 
    (13.0304)    (3.90656)   
DE  -  -7.10E-05    0.01109  *** 
    (-0.73329)    (10.1843)   
Big4  +  0.647597  *  9.26248  *** 
      (1.625475)     (2.58219)    
Number of Obs.   6834     6667    
Adjusted R-squared   0.07477     0.02504    
The definitions of variables are given in Table 7. 
***correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
*correlation is significant at the 0.1 level. 
 
With  the  lagged  methodology,  the  relationships  of  explanatory  and  dependent 
variables do not change significantly. 
In Table 9, the positive lagged AA produces a statistically significant impact at a 1% 
level, both on ROE and ROA. However, only for ROE is the signal negative—as expected 
(Chan et. al, 2004). This result means that higher AA in the previous year causes a decrease in 
the firm’s current performance. For ROA, the relationship with the positive, previous year AA 
is still positive, meaning that the reverse effect does not happen in consecutives years. 
With regard to the control variables included, all variables are statistically significant 
and produce the expected effect on ROE and ROA, except for DE, which is not significant 
and presents the opposite effect. Nevertheless, the impact is very small; close to zero. The 
explanatory variables Size and Big4 produce a positive impact on ROA, as well as on ROE.  






Table 9: Impact of positive lagged AA on firm performance 
Independent   Predicted  Coefficient  Prob.  Coefficient  Prob. 
variable  Sign  (Ols t-statistics)    (Ols t-statistics) 
      ROA     ROE    
c    -5.285626  ***  -24.621  *** 
    (-5.406421)    (-6.3936)   
lagAA+  -  -6.448162  ***  15.7162  *** 
    (-2.810532)    (1.71329)   
Size  +  0.742743  ***  2.19134  *** 
    (10.01937)    (7.53244)   
DE  -  -0.000155    0.00655  *** 
    (-1.010662)    (9.57601)   
Big4  +  1.193822  ***  5.53325  *** 
      (3.440432)     (4.09131)    
Number of Obs.  6302    6204   
Adjusted R-squared  0.038901     0.03827    
The definitions of variables are given in Table 7. 
***correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
In Table 10, the negative lagged AA does not have a statistically significant impact on 
firm performance, neither on ROA nor ROE. The signal is positive and opposite from the 
expected because the variable AA is supposed to reverse (Chan et. al, 2004). 
  The explanatory  variable Size is the most robust because  in all tests it  presents  a 
significance level of 1%, as well as the expected signal: when the size of a firm increases its 
economic performance improves. The results for Big4 are also robust but, at this time, the 
significance level is 5%. DE is not consistent: with ROA it produces the predicted negative 
impact on performance but without significance. With ROE the relationship becomes positive 
and significant. 20 
 
Table 10: Impact of negative lagged AA on firm performance 
Independent   Predicted  Coefficient  Prob.  Coefficient  Prob. 
variable  Sign  (Ols t-statistics)  (Ols t-statistics) 
      ROA     ROE    
c    -9.512816  ***  -29.542  *** 
    (-7.514814)    (-2.5858)   
lagAA-  -  24.31285    27.5722   
    (8.353881)    (1.0248)   
Size  +  1.05992  ***  2.30731  *** 
    (11.20457)    (2.70801)   
DE  -  -4.46E-06    0.01111  *** 
    (-0.047158)    (9.66621)   
Big4  +  0.945406  **  8.36466  ** 
      (2.166903)     (2.148)    
Number of Obs.  6137    5976   
Adjusted R-squared  0.047587     0.0192    
The definitions of variables are given in Table 7. 
***correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Section 4: Conclusions 
The findings provide evidence that accounting quality tends to produce a negative impact on 
firm performance within European countries: ROA and ROE increase when the positive AA 
increases and decrease when negative AA becomes more negative. Thus, our results confirm 
the mechanical relationship between accounting ratio for performance and current AA for 
accounting quality. 
With regard to the lagged AA approach, the only expected relationship occurs between 
lagged positive AA and ROA that is negative, because the effect is supposed to reverse (Chan 
et al, 2004). Therefore, higher AA in the previous year tends to reduce the firm’s current 
performance. The other three coefficients are positive, thus our results suggest that the reverse 
effect does not occur in two consecutive years. 
As control variables of firm performance are concerned, the results obtained show that 
size and being auditing by a Big4 firm are relevant factors and that they produce a positive 
impact on firm performance in both approaches: current and lagged. In other words, huge 
firms and those audited by one of the biggest international auditing company exhibit the best 
performances. These results were obtained in all tests. Regarding capital structure, it is the 21 
 
only control variable that is not consistent. DE produces the opposite effect from the predicted 
on firm performance. When leverage scaled by equity rises, the firm performance improves 
both for ROA and ROE in the current AA approach and for ROE in the lagged AA approach. 
This might occur to prevent debt constraints as explained by Betty and Weber (2002). The 
only exception is for lagged AA, which produces a negative impact on ROA, meaning that a 
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